



# Bank Restructuring "à la belge"

A primer on Law in the Books vs Law in Action

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#### **Prelude**

- "Fortis-case" (Oct. 2008)
  - No resolution powers for state/supervisor
  - No resolution toolbox
  - Interference of courts
    - Dec. 2008: Minority shareholders obtained court order to convene general meeting of shareholders (Dec. 2008)
    - Jan. 2009: General meeting of shareholders rejects sale of business -> renegotiation
    - Apr. 2009: General meeting of shareholders accepts renegotiated sale







## Prelude (2)

- "Crisis law" Oct. 2008:
  - Authorises Government to amend/complement existing supervision laws in situations of "sudden crisis in the financial markets" or "serious threat of a systemic crisis"
  - Provides legal basis for state guarantees to distressed financial institutions
    - Used in various cases
  - No resolution toolbox







- Law 2 June 2010
  - Facilitation of 'voluntary' resolutions:
    - -> board of directors can, in exceptional situations, set aside limitations of powers stemming from company bylaws
  - Extension of 'early intervention' powers of financial supervisor
    - Swift intervention in situations of urgency
    - Temporary suspension of activities
  - Resolution powers and measures
    - -> Inspired by UK Banking Act 2009







- Scope of application
  - All categories of financial institutions (banks, investment firms, insurance firms, financial holdings, ...)
  - Goes along with exclusion of general 'Chapter 11' law to those institutions
    - What if distressed FI does not threaten financial stability?







- Resolution Authority
  - Powers entrusted to the (federal) government
    - Resolution order by Royal Decree
    - No specific powers for MoF governemt as a whole acts
  - Immunisation of civil liability
    - State and all persons acting for the account of the state in the resolution
    - Immunisation for 'fraud' and 'gross negligence'







- Criteria for resolution measures
  - "Threat to Belgian or international financial stability"
    - Criteria to be taken into account are further specified, but remain vague
    - Eg Banks: volume of deposits, importance on the credit market or role in the financial system
  - No set of transparent criteria of quantitative triggers







- Resolution toolkit
  - Mainly focused on 'bail-out'
    - Mandatory transfer of assets/activities/shares
    - To the state or to other public or private entities
      - Includes 'bridge bank'
  - No statutory bail-in regime
  - Resolution order prohibits concerned FI to dispose of the assets,
  - Resolution does not affect existing contracts/no termination
    - => resolution seems to neutralise close out-netting







- Resolution and the courts
  - Automatic and immediate court scrutiny of the resolution measure
    - Strict deadlines: decision within max. 1 month
    - Excludes all other possibilities for court interference
  - Scope of court scrutiny:
    - · Legality of the resolution order
      - Formal legality
      - Substantive legality: threat to financial stability?
    - Fairness of the compensation to the 'owners'
  - Competent court: Court of first instance Brussels
  - Court decision gives effect to the resolution order







#### **Conclusions**

- Financial crisis calls for exceptional laws
  - But: are fundamental safeguards sufficiently put into balance?
  - Lawyers will have to take into account economic concepts in legal assessment ('financial stability')
- Lack of effectiveness in situations with cross-border ramifications
  - Dexia 2011: law was not used to sell Dexia Bank to Belgian state -> fear of 'retaliations'?
- "Work in progress"
  - Statutory regime for 'bail-in'?
  - EU regime is inevitable in EU single market

